Natural disasters, industrial accidents , terrorism attacks, and pandemics all have the capacity to result in large numbers of critically ill or injured patients. This supplement provides suggestions for all of those involved in a disaster or pandemic with multiple critically ill patients, including front-line clinicians, hospital administrators, professional societies, and public health or government offi cials. The current Task Force included a total of 100 participants from nine countries, comprised of clinicians and experts from a wide variety of disciplines. Comprehensive literature searches were conducted to identify studies upon which evidence-based recommendations could be made. No studies of suffi cient quality were identifi ed. Therefore, the panel developed expert-opinion-based suggestions that are presented in this supplement using a modifi ed Delphi process. The ultimate aim of the supplement is to expand the focus beyond the walls of ICUs to provide recommendations for the management of all critically ill or injured adults and children resulting from a pandemic or disaster wherever that care may be provided. Considerations for the management of critically ill patients include clinical priorities and logistics (supplies, evacuation, and triage) as well as the key enablers (systems planning, business continuity, legal framework, and ethical considerations) that facilitate the provision of this care. The supplement also aims to illustrate how the concepts of mass critical care are integrated across the spectrum of surge events from conventional through contingency to crisis standards of care.
Natural disasters, industrial accidents, terrorism attacks, and pandemics all have the capacity to result in large numbers of critically ill or injured patients. 1 Depending on their magnitude, the response to these surges may vary from a conventional response, where critically ill patients are managed with no signifi cant alterations in standards or process of care, to a crisis response, where resource limitations dictate signifi cant alterations in both standards and process of care to provide minimal basic critical care to the maximum number of patients ( Fig 1 ) . 2 -6 Th is supplement provides suggestions for all of those involved in a disaster or pandemic with multiple critically ill patients, including front-line clinicians, hospital administrators, professional societies, and public health or government offi cials. Although it is important for all providers to be familiar with the aspects of critical care disaster/pandemic management, Table 1 provides an overview of the suggestions of most interest to each of the groups.
In 2008, the American College of Chest Physicians (CHEST) Task Force on Mass Critical Care published its fi rst series of disaster critical care suggestions. 1 , 5 , 7 -9 Th eir published document refl ected their consensus deliberations and proposed suggestions regarding the care of critically ill and injured patients from disasters. Th e supplement was received enthusiastically by both the medical and broader public health communities, becoming the second most frequently downloaded supplement from CHEST's website, and papers from the supplement have been cited in 157 publications indexed on the Web of Science ( http :// thomsonreuters . com / web -of -science ). Th e eff ort was timely, as many hospitals applied the suggestions to respond to regional crises related to the 2009 infl uenza A(H1N1) pandemic. 10 -16 Several recent disasters have brought new learning since the original documents were published. Also, the 2008 documents had minimal direction for the management of pediatrics, trauma, subspecialty ICU populations, or critical care outside of developed countries. Consequently, the Task Force for Mass Critical Care was reconvened with an expanded scope and expertise to provide a rigorously developed set of usable guidelines to critical care providers responding to disasters or pandemics throughout the world.
Th e assumptions 1 upon which the fi rst Task Force suggestions were based remain largely unchanged. Since 2008, the world has coped with the 2009 A(H1N1) pandemic as well as a myriad of other events that have either resulted in or have had the potential to create large numbers of critically ill patients or disrupt existing regional critical care infrastructure: Japan earthquake/ tsunami 2011, 17 Buenos Aires train crash 2012, Brazil night club fi re 2013, Boston marathon bombing 2013, 18 , 19 Spanish train crash 2013, super-storm Sandy, 20 , 21 and the Westgate mall attack 2013 Nairobi. Th e horizon is studded with potential pandemics, such as H7N9 22 and MERS CoV 23 ; in addition, confl icts and regional instability increase the risk of conventional and chemical weapons attacks. 24 -26 Clearly, hospitals and clinicians still need to be prepared to manage large numbers of critically ill or injured patients.
Cognizant of the burgeoning experience since the 2008 supplement, the Task Force for Mass Critical Care reconvened in 2012 and 2013 to review, update, and expand the suggestions presented in the 2008 Figure 1 -Th is fi gure depicts the spectrum of surge from minor through major. Th e magnitude of surge is illustrated by the alterations in the balance between demand (stick people) and supply (medication boxes). As surge increases, the demand-supply imbalance worsens. Conventional, contingency, and crisis responses are used to respond to the varying magnitude of surge. Varying response strategies are associated with each level of response. As the magnitude of the surge increases, the strategies used to cope with the response gradually depart from the usual standard of care (default defi ning the standards of disaster care) until such point that even with crisis care, critical care is no longer able to be provided. Our methodology had to recognize that there is still a paucity of high-quality evidence upon which to develop evidence-based recommendations for Mass Critical Care. Th e Task Force met in Chicago, Illinois in June 2012 to develop key questions. We then conducted comprehensive literature searches to identify evidence that could be used to answer the questions and provide evidence-based "recommendations." Although some relevant studies were identifi ed, none of the studies provided a suffi cient quality of evidence upon which to make recommendations; therefore, expert opinion was solicited to provide answers ("suggestions") to the key questions. To improve the rigor of the expert opinion, a modifi ed Delphi process was used following the structure and guidelines established by the CHEST Guidelines Oversight Committee. 27 All participants developing the Task Force's suggestions (panelists and topic editors) were vetted through the CHEST confl ict of interest policy. Th e primary context for the Task Force's suggestions remains health-care systems in the developed world. Th e language used throughout this supplement is not intended to refer to any one specifi c national context but rather should be viewed to be applicable in most large countries organized with a geographically based political structure incorporating a single national government with successive tiers of governments extending to local levels ( Fig 3 ) . 28 , 29 Because the audience for these suggestions is those in resource-rich settings in developed countries, the Task Force has separately addressed the issue of mass critical care in resource-poor settings and provides suggestions to improve the provision of care in this context by strengthening existing systems and leveraging strategic relationships with world bodies and organizations from developed countries.
Summary of Suggestions
We provide a summary of the suggestions from the 13 articles included in the supplement. Please refer to the appropriate article for a detailed discussion of the suggestions.
Surge Capacity Principles
Role of Critical Care in Disaster Planning 1. We suggest hospital and local/regional disaster committees include a critical care expert to optimize critical care surge capacity planning. Targets for Surge Response 3. We suggest in the presence of a slow onset, impending disaster/threat, targets for surge capacity and capability be focused, where possible, on projected patient loads.
4a. We suggest hospital critical care resources be able to expand immediately by at least 20% above the baseline ICU maximal capacity for a conventional response.
4b. In a contingency response, we suggest hospital critical care resources be able to expand rapidly by at least 100% above the baseline ICU capacity to meet patient demand using local and regional resources.
4c. We suggest hospital critical care resources be able to expand by at least 200% above baseline ICU capacity to meet patient demand in a crisis response using any combination of local, regional, national, and international resources.
5.
We suggest more prolonged demands on critical care compared with the demands placed on other sections of the hospital (ie, days rather than hours) be taken into consideration when resuming routine hospital activities that may require ICU support.
Situational Awareness and Information Sharing 6. We suggest facilities, coalitions, and other components of the emergency response system, including those related to government entities, study how information about patients, events, and epidemiology are shared on a routine basis and during a major incident. Information technology (IT) should be leveraged to provide better indicators, more rapid alerting, and better patient data to facilitate decision-making.
7.
We suggest the ability to provide dynamic forecasting of the functioning and sustainability of the supply chain be supported by hospitals.
Mitigating the Impact on Critical Care 8a. We suggest medically fragile patients be supported and protected by pre-event planning for ongoing medical support in the community to mitigate their reliance on hospital-based resources during a disaster event.
8b. We suggest local and regional authorities be responsible for integration of preventive community medical support in the plans to treat medically fragile patients during disasters.
8c. Given a situation where mitigation measures fail, medically fragile patients and victims of a disaster or pandemic should be given equal consideration for access to ICU resources.
Planning of Surge Capacity for Unique Populations 9a. We suggest regional planning include the expectation that the hospital be able to provide initial stabilization care to unique populations that they may not normally serve such as pediatrics, burn and trauma patients.
9b. We suggest access to regional expertise for care of all patients who require specialty critical care services including participation in the planning phase and access to just-in-time consultation for care coordination during a response.
Service Deescalation and Engineered Failure 10a. We suggest hospitals adopt a process of engineered systems cessation when the staff and/or material resources required for the ongoing critical care of a small number of patients could be used to save a greater number of lives.
10b. We suggest hospital cessation of the delivery of critical care services be considered if such endeavors are likely to entail signifi cant personal risk to the treating team despite the availability of personal protective equipment and appropriate medical countermeasures.
10c. We suggest a hospital's decision to restrict or expand the delivery of critical care be made as part of a local/regional decision-making process with consultation and input provided by hospital ICU leadership.
Surge Capacity Logistics
Stockpiling of Equipment, Supplies, and Pharmaceuticals 1. We suggest hospital support services, including pharmacy, laboratory, radiology, respiratory therapy, and nutrition services, also be included in the planning of critical care surge.
2. We suggest equipment, supplies, and pharmaceutical stockpiles specifi c to the delivery of mass critical care (MCC) be interoperable and compatible at the regional level and ideally at the state/provincial level, so as to ensure uniformity of response capabilities, coordinated training, and a mechanism for exchange of material among facilities.
3. We suggest facilities should ensure adequate availability of disaster supplies through facility-based caches, with vendor agreements and understanding of supply chain resources and limitations.
4.
We suggest the existing MCC hospital target lists for basic equipment, supplies, and pharmaceuticals remain relevant for institutions seeking to plan for MCC response.
5. We suggest regional and hospital stockpiles include equipment, supplies, and pharmaceuticals that can be used to accommodate the needs of unique populations that are likely to require critical care in centers other than specialty care centers, including pediatric, burn, and trauma patients. 18. We suggest deployable critical care services may serve as temporary critical care locations provided there is a clear plan for patient transfer, within a few hours to days, to a defi nitive treatment location.
In crisis surge response, we suggest less intensive treatment of moderately injured patients be prioritized over the deployment of temporary critical care services when it would result in improved outcomes for larger numbers of patients.
Using Transportation Assets to Support Surge Response 20. We suggest surge capacity plans include predetermined standards that defi ne minimal ongoing critical care capability in order to defi ne the framework for decisions regarding patient transfer as the demands on the system gradually increase during a disaster or pandemic.
We suggest priority be given to transfer of assets to patients, particularly when transfer of patients to defi nitive care is limited by dangerous conditions (including considerable risk posed by available transportation options).
22. Transportation used for patient evacuations may also be used to bring in assets (eg, specialty providers and equipment), particularly when access/transport capacity is the limiting factor in patient movement.
Evacuation of the ICU
Form Hospital and Transport Agreements 1a. We suggest local and regional mutual-aid agreements should be established with other appropriately staff ed and resourced hospitals to redistribute critically ill and injured patients from an evacuating hospital(s), and these agreements should be integrated within the framework of disaster preparedness plans.
1b. We suggest creation of predisaster formal agreements between hospitals and transport agencies or between Health Coalitions or Regional Health Authorities and transport agencies for air or ground transport of critically ill patients during a disaster.
Prepare for and Simulate Critical Care Evacuation 2a. We suggest staffi ng requirements within disaster plans should take into account the staffi ng resources necessary for desired surge capability to both safely move patients and to provide continuous care for patients remaining in the ICU.
2b. We suggest developing a detailed vertical evacuation plan using stairs when applicable for critically ill and injured patients.
2c. We suggest hospital exercises should simulate a mass critical care event and include vertical evacuation when applicable that evaluates (1) patient movement using specialized evacuation equipment and (2) the ability to maintain eff ective respiratory and hemodynamic support while moving down stairs.
Prepare for and Simulate Critical Care Transport 3a. We suggest specialized care is resource intensive, and specialized ground and aeromedical teams may be required to ensure appropriate initial and ongoing care prior to and during evacuation.
3b. We suggest preidentifying unique transport resources that are required for movement of specifi c populations, such as critically ill neonates, children, and technology-dependent patients, at a regional level. Th is information can then be used in real time to match allocated resources to patients.
3c. We suggest conducting detailed and realistic exercises that require ICU evacuation with local and regional ground and air transport agencies.
Designate a Critical Care Team Leader 4a. We suggest the Incident Management System at the evacuating ICU hospital should support early and frequent communication between Incident Command and a designated Critical Care Team Leader (CCTL) dur ing an impending evacuation to provide close coor dination and support of ICU evacuation preparations.
4b. We suggest the CCTL coordinating the critical care evacuation should be responsible for (1) categorizing ICU patients by ICU resource requirement and (2) communicating these ICU patient resource requirements with the Hospital Incident Command and to any Regional or National Emergency Command Center supporting hospital evacuation.
4c. We suggest when preparing for and during an ICU evacuation, a primary role of the CCTL should be to categorize each candidate ICU patient evacuee by (1) ICU resources required and (2) skill set of transport staff required.
4d. We suggest CCTLs and staff should receive special training, education, and practice on patient categorization and transport requirements.
4e. Expert providers from evacuation teams and outside facilities, when possible through face-to-face communication on site, can help ensure appropriate transport planning and distribution based on available resources during transport and in receiving facilities.
Initiate Pre-Event ICU Evacuation Plan 5a. If pre-event hospital evacuation of critically ill patients might be required, then we suggest planning for patient evacuation or shelter in place using an Incident Command System should begin as early as possible. Possible strategies include shelter in place, partial evacuation, or early evacuation, depending on the circumstances. 5b. We suggest Hospital Incident Command during a threatened hospital evacuation should have a clear and direct mechanism for communication with local governing bodies that control the timing and issuance of regional evacuation orders. To prevent obstruction of ground medical transport during hospital evacuation, coordination with local government regarding timing of recommendations for evacuation of the general population may be required. Effi cient ground medical transport of patients during a hospital evacuation may be facilitated by providing a time period for hospital evacuation prior to recommendations for evacuation of the general population.
Requesting Assistance for Evacuation 6a. We suggest during a disaster or pandemic that overwhelms local and regional resources and requires large-scale hospital evacuations assistance, from national and/or international government medical support and evacuation agencies should be requested.
6b. We suggest the CCTL should be aware of the process for requesting evacuation assistance and the resources available at a regional and national level. 9b. We suggest during multiple-facility, large, or late ICU evacuations, the usual provider-to-provider system of communication for identifi cation of receiving facilities should be augmented by other Regional or National Incident Management Systems.
9b.i. Every hospital should be specifi cally affi liated with (and drill evacuation with) a Regional or National Command Center for such events. Regional or National Command Centers may need to assume responsibility for designation of the receiving facilities for their patients.
9b.ii. We suggest when a Regional or National Emergency Command Center assumes responsibility for patient distribution, they should be responsible for identifying receiving facilities that match ICU patient resource requirements.
9b.iii. We suggest the Regional or National Emergency Command Center should enlist assistance of regional specialist experts to assist in the above matching process for distribution of patients requiring highly specialized care among receiving centers.
9c. We suggest assignment of transportation resources and lines of critical care patient evacuation should follow common existing referral patterns provided receiving facilities retain adequate capacity to care for these patients.
9d. We suggest patients who require advanced specialty care should be directed to high-volume centers and distribution take into account the capacity and resources required to provide ongoing care to these patients. Sending Critical Care Patient Information With Patient 11a. We suggest electronic transfer of patient information to the receiving hospital is optimal because a complete medical record can be included. Electronic transfer may be through an intranet or by copying patient information onto a USB flash memory drive or compact disk and transferring the information with the patient (see the "Business and Continuity of Operations" article in this consensus statement).
11b. We suggest a paper medical record be required to travel with the patient because there may be no ability to send an electronic copy of the medical record, or the receiving facility may not be able to read the electronic format of the medical record. A backup paper system may require (a) a printed copy of the electronic medical record or (b) a handwritten patient identifi cation on a standardized patient tracking form. Any paper system should include basic patient identifi cation, problem lists, and medications on forms that travel with the patient.
Transporting Critical Care Patients to Receiving Hospitals 12a. We suggest transportation methods should prioritize moving the greatest number of patients as rapidly and safely as possible to locations with adequate capacity and expertise where defi nitive care can be provided.
12b. We suggest local evacuation of highest acuity patients to hospitals with additional capacity by ground or rotary transport may be most appropriate to minimize risk and reduce ongoing critical care demands at the incident facility.
12c. We suggest alteration in the usual standards for modes of transport may be required during a disaster where transport resources are overwhelmed and evacuation and transport of critically ill patients to a receiving hospital ICU is required. 2. We suggest critical care only be rationed when resources have, or will shortly be, overwhelmed despite all eff orts at augmentation and a regional-level authority that holds the legal authority and adequate situational awareness has declared an emergency and activated its mass critical care plan.
3. We suggest health-care systems provide oversight for any triage decisions made under their authority via activation of a mass critical care plan to ensure they comply with the prescribed process and include appropriate documentation.
4.
We suggest health-care systems that have instituted a triage policy have a central process to update the triage protocol/system so that information that becomes available during an event informs the process in order to promote the most eff ective allocation of resources.
5.
We suggest health-care systems establish in advance, a formal legal and systematic structure for triage in order to facilitate eff ective implementation of triage in the event of an overwhelming disaster.
6. We suggest health-care systems that have instituted a triage policy triage patients based on improved incremental survival rather than on a fi rst-come, fi rst-served basis when a substantial incremental survival diff erence favors the allocation of resources to another patient.
Triage offi cers:
7a. We suggest health-care systems that have instituted a triage policy have clinicians with critical care triage training function as triage offi cers (tertiary triage) to provide optimum allocation of resources.
7b. We suggest triage offi cers should have situational awareness at both a regional level and institutional level.
7c. We suggest in trauma or burn disasters, triage be carried out by triage offi cers who are senior surgeons/ physicians with experience in trauma, burns, or critical care and experience in care of the age-group of the patient being triaged.
7d. We suggest in environments where triage is not usual, individual triage offi cers or teams consisting of a senior intensive care physician and an acute care physician be designated to make mass critical care triage decisions in accordance with previously prepared, publicly vetted, and widely disseminated guidelines.
7e. We suggest in limited resource settings in which there is a limited need for expansion of critical care resources, a continuation of well-established systems is appropriate.
8. We suggest triage protocols (clinical decision support systems), rather than clinical judgment alone, be used in triage whenever possible. 9. We suggest in health-care systems that have instituted a triage policy, technology such as baseline ultrasound, oxygen saturation as measured by pulse oximetry, mobile phone/Internet, and telemedicine be leveraged in triage where appropriate and available to augment clinical assessment in an eff ort to improve incremental survival and effi ciency of resource allocation.
10. We suggest triage decision processes, whenever possible, provide for an appeals mechanism in case of deviation from an approved process (which may be a prospective or retrospective review) or a clinician request for reevaluation in light of novel or updated clinical information (prospective).
Triage process:
11a. We suggest tertiary-care triage protocols for use during a disaster that overwhelms or threatens to overwhelm resources be developed with inclusion and exclusion criteria.
11b. We suggest the inclusion criteria for admission to intensive care.
11c. We suggest patients who will have such a low probability of survival that signifi cant benefi t is unlikely be excluded from ICUs when resources are overwhelmed.
11d. We suggest consideration be given to excluding patient groups that have a life expectancy , 1 year.
11e. We suggest if a physiologic (nondisease-specifi c) outcome prediction score can be demonstrated to reliably predict mortality in a specifi ed population upon screening for ICU admission, it is reasonable to use this to exclude admission for patients with a predicted mortality rate . 90%. Similarly if a diseasespecifi c score can be demonstrated to reliably predict mortality when used in the same manner for patients with the disease, we suggest it is reasonable to use this to exclude admissions for patients with a predicted mortality rate of . 90%.
11f. We suggest each patient's condition be reassessed aft er a suitable time period (eg, 72 h) by the triage offi cer or triage team. If at that point the patient meets the criteria for exclusion from ICU, consideration should be given to withdrawal of therapy. If in
the future a score is demonstrated to reliably predict high mortality when the patient is assessed during ICU stay, this should be used in preference to or as a supplement to clinical judgment.
Special Populations
Defi ning Special Populations for Mass Critical Care
We suggest the defi nition of special populations for mass critical care be those patients that may be at increased risk for morbidity and mortality outside a fully functional critical care environment or those patients that present unique challenges to providers when a full complement of supportive services is not available. We include the chronically ill and technologically dependent as the fragility of their baseline health puts them at signifi cant risk for progression to a higher level of medical need.
Special Population Planning 2. We suggest critical care disaster planning include special populations.
We suggest professional societies, advocacy groups, governmental, and nongovernmental organizations
be consulted when planning special population disaster preparedness and just-in-time care.
We suggest daily needs assessment of shelters include identifi cation of those residents from special populations susceptible to decompensation to critical illness.
A system to refer those identifi ed to appropriate medical care should be in place.
5.
We suggest disaster preparedness for special populations be part of their primary health-care maintenance. Th ese patients should also be identifi ed pre-event by their community (ie, nursing home facilities, health-care services, and social services providers) as an at-risk group for decompensation during a disaster and measures be taken to ensure they have a continuum of care during the event.
Planning for Access to Regionalized Services for Special Populations 6. We suggest identifi cation of regionalized centers and establishment of communication be included in mass critical care planning.
7. We suggest regional specialized centers have mass disaster plans in place that include easily accessible, multidimensional, round-the-clock expertise available for consultation by local providers during mass critical care events.
Some special populations of mass critical care may require early transfer to specialized centers to maximize outcomes so should be identifi ed early.
Triage and Resource Allocation of Special Populations 9. We suggest triage and resource allocation of special populations adhere to the same resource allocation strategy and process as the general population.
Therapeutic Considerations
10a. We suggest local, regional, and national critical care pharmacists and resources be identifi ed during disaster preparedness.
10b. We suggest access to critical care or specialist pharmacist and resources include consideration for special populations such as those with burns, cirrhosis, organ transplant, and need for dialysis.
10c. We suggest pharmacists, especially those with critical care and specialty training, be an integral part of any mass critical care disaster team. 
We suggest research be conducted in crisis standard of care triggers for special populations that includes clinical, planning, and ethical domains across the life cycle of a disaster.
12. We suggest experts in the care of technology-and resource-dependent special populations convene to discuss and determine the acceptable parameters for crisis standards of care for a disaster.
System-Level Planning, Coordination, and Communication
National Government Support of Health-care Coalitions/Regional Health Authorities-Policy 1a. We suggest political leadership at national levels should support health-care preparedness through fi nancial assistance, support of market driven incentives, and preparedness requirements to health-care coalitions/regional health authorities (HC/RHAs).
1b. We suggest national governments should support the development of responsive and nimble disaster/pandemic research processes that can both organize and assess information from prior disasters/pandemics, acquire real-time data in an ongoing one to provide situational awareness, and which can also learn from and support international disaster relief eff orts.
1c. We suggest national, state/province/regional, and city/district governments should:
• Working with health-care experts and leadership, develop formal legal disaster/pandemic activation mechanisms to initiate, implement, and support disaster/pandemic plans and standards of care for HC/RHAs and health-care professionals; and legally initiate step down termination procedures and processes as conditions and criteria warrant in the recovery phase • Work with health-care experts and leadership in the greater health-care community to develop and refi ne specifi c "trigger" criteria for formal legal activation and step down termination procedures and processes of disaster/pandemic plans and standards of care.
1d. We suggest local governments and government agencies should be formal partners in their local health-care coalition(s), and be actively engaged with their ongoing preparedness and response activities. The Use of Simulation for Preparedness and Planning 8. We suggest hospitals, health systems, and HC/RHAs promote the use of computer modeling to gain insight into their operational capabilities and limitations, in the following ways:
• Support the creation of computer models utilizing industry templates in collaboration with their own administrative, clinical, and technical resource experts from participating system partners. Models should include government and military resources when applicable, and include provision of maintenance of chronically ill patient populations. • Collaborate with modelers in the design, implementation, and testing of these models; and with the interpretation and application of these results. • Support the data requirements for such system models, and develop repositories for operationally relevant data that can be used in future modeling eff orts. • Leverage their relationships with national, regional, and local governments and public health agencies and emergency medical service providers to obtain necessary data on the transportation and patient logistic components of such models as required.
Business and Continuity of Operations
Supply Chain Vulnerabilities in Mass Critical Care 1. We suggest highest priority critical care supplies and medications needed for routine day-to-day care, and crucial in mass casualty events, for which no substitutions are available be identifi ed (eg, ventilator circuits, N95 masks, insulin, etc). Once identifi ed, dual sourcing should be used for routine purchasing of these key supplies and medications to reduce the impact of a supply chain disruption.
2. We suggest available alternatives for routinely used critical care supplies and medications (eg, sedatives, vasopressors, antimicrobials, etc) be identifi ed in routine practice and pre-event planning to anticipate solutions to supply chain disruptions.
3. We suggest health-care systems use integrated electronic systems to track purchase, storage, and use of medical supplies.
4.
We suggest these systems be used to identify equipment, supplies, and medications that are in short supply and for which increased routine inventory levels would be needed to adequately address both day-to-day and mass casualty event planning.
5.
We suggest modifi ed use protocols, which restrict routine use of aff ected medications and supplies and encourage use of alternatives, be implemented at the earliest opportunity when impending medication and medical supply shortages are identifi ed, and for which adequate resupply may not be available in a timely manner.
6. We suggest health-care facilities, health systems, and health-care coalitions encourage, comply with, and support ongoing governmental and non-governmental organizational eff orts to reduce global medical supply chain vulnerabilities.
Health Information Technology Continuity in Disasters
Portable Mobile Support Information Networks: 7. We suggest hospitals have the mobile technology necessary to identify patients quickly and eff ectively, including in austere parts of the hospital (eg, parking lots).
8. We suggest hospitals have the ability to set up ad-hoc secure networks in austere sections of the hospital campuses for mobile technology. 9. We suggest hospitals have a strategy for supplying austere sites with electric power to charge the mobile devices, provide local network facilities, and provide essential services for an extended period of time.
10. We suggest hospitals be capable of transferring patient identifi cation, identifi cation of next of kin with contact information, and a defi ned minimal database of medical history with every patient. Th is minimal database of medical history should be able to be printed, or hand written if necessary, in the absence of computer technology.
11
. We suggest hospitals have the ability to effectively and quickly download all patient-related information into a mobile package (eg, a flash drive or disk) that can be easily read by other information systems, and can be rapidly prepared for transport with the patient. Th is should obey the clinical document architecture/continuity of care document documents currently specifi ed under meaningful use proposals, making them both human and digitally readable.
We suggest hospitals have real-time connection to databases for uploading and downloading clinical information.
13. We suggest hospitals have the necessary information technology (IT) functionality to store health information when hospital systems are not available, and be able to rapidly upload and download clinical information once connections are reestablished.
14.
We suggest hospitals have the means to ensure confi dentiality of all patient protected information.
15. We suggest patient information may be uploaded and stored in central, off site databases, similar to that used by the Veterans Administration system in the United States, and consistent with local health-care laws and regulation pertaining to patient privacy and protections.
Hospitals and Health-Care IT Preparedness Planning 16. We suggest hospitals have a plan for rapid movement of the data center to off site remote operations in the case of prolonged local power disruption for critical functions.
17.
We suggest a plan be in place to provide power to the client machines, analyzers, networking equipment, etc along with the data center for an extended period of time.
We suggest hospitals plan around extended supply disruption of critical IT supplies, such as servers and disk drives.
Engagement and Education 1. We suggest integrated communication systems and a robust infrastructure of the electronic health record system to facilitate tracking the number of people aff ected by a mass event, including the types and severity of injuries and detection of secondary illnesses.
We suggest, when power is intact, virtual ICUs, point-of-care testing, portable monitoring systems with Global Positioning System, and telemedicine facilitate transfer and sharing of clinical information.
Such technologies need to be established and used prior to mass critical care delivery in order to provide familiarity to the users.
We suggest aggregated essential clinical information be included with other key ICU logistical
communication so that bidirectional transfer of information permits a consistent delivery of health care across the spectrum.
4.
We suggest public health/government offi cials at centralized or regional emergency management coordinating centers use expert medical guidance, such as burn, neuro, or trauma critical care, specifi c to the nature of the incident to inform decision-making for mass critical care delivery.
5.
We suggest every ICU clinician participate in disaster response training and education.
6. We suggest expectations regarding clinician response to disasters or pandemics be delineated in contractual agreements, medical staff bylaws, or other formal documents that govern the array of responsibilities to the health-care system.
7.
We suggest hospitals employ and/or train ICU physicians in disaster preparedness and response.
8. We suggest hospitals ensure appropriate ICU leadership with knowledge and expertise in the management of surge capacity, disaster response, and ICU evacuation.
9.
We suggest critical care leaders be invited to participate in health-care coalitions so they can facilitate sharing expertise, resources, and knowledge between ICUs in the event of a regional disaster.
10. We suggest incorporation of disaster medicine into critical care training curricula will facilitate future ICU clinician training and engagement in disaster preparedness and response activities.
11. We suggest expert opinions be considered in mass critical care education curricula.
12.
We suggest an independent panel of multidisciplinary specialty society experts determine the core competencies for mass critical care education curriculum.
13. We suggest translating competencies into multidisciplinary learning modules become a core focus of academic, professional organizations, governmental, and nongovernmental organizations whose students and responsible agencies may be called upon to provide mass critical care.
14.
We suggest standing committees in education, or a reasonable equivalent in relevant stakeholder groups, review and endorse the curriculum and competencies. vidual, organizational, community) , realistic, and challenging training opportunities. 16 . We suggest stakeholder organizations determine the thresholds and milestones for trainer education and certifi cation.
We suggest educational activities draw on all modern modalities of education (including access via web-based learning, simulation, or other modalities for remote learners) and include incremental (indi-
17. We suggest individuals with board certifi cation in critical care medicine be tested on the core competencies (when developed) by their certifi cation process.
18. We suggest those involved with critical care disaster education develop ongoing, internal process improvement methodologies and metrics to ensure their programs remain current, responsive, and relevant.
19. We suggest accreditation bodies that ensure safe and eff ective critical care delivery processes for hospitals consult with professional societies to develop metrics and tools of assessment to ensure ICUs can continue to provide quality care during a disaster or pandemic.
20.
We suggest engagement of critical care clinicians in disaster preparedness eff orts occur in advance of and in preparation for pandemics and disasters in order to enhance mass critical care delivery and coordination.
We suggest ICU clinicians and disaster planners incorporate community values into critical care decision-making through pre-event inclusion of clinicians and community perspectives.
22. We suggest hospitals provide education, training, and community conversation opportunities for their ICU clinicians on the topic of mass critical care delivery. 1b. We suggest MCC plans clarify approaches and processes for evacuating patients and for shelteringin-place. Th is includes identifying the lines of authority for evacuation and shelter-in-place decision-making and the potential legal and ethical implications associated with such decisions.
We suggest
1c. We suggest MCC plans recognize the importance of responsible and accountable MCC decision making among clinicians, government, and individual health-care entities by addressing how reviews of decisions made under the auspices of MCC plans will occur. Further, we suggest separate, effi cient processes be developed to: (1) during the response, address fact-based appeals by ICU providers of decisions made during the response before resources are reallocated; and (2) following the response, review patient/family member or ICU provider concerns about fi delity to the processes outlined in properly-vetted and adopted MCC plans.
We suggest during declared emergencies: (1) government MCC plans be offi cially activated by the applicable governmental authority; and (2) individual
health-care facility MCC plans be offi cially activated by clinical administrative leadership. We also suggest governments and individual health-care facilities develop approaches for the offi cial deactivation of their MCC plans.
3a. We suggest clinicians (both employees and volunteers) and health-care entities involved in the provision of critical care that follow properlyvetted and offi cially-activated (1) governmental and (2) individual facility-level MCC plans in good faith
should be protected legally from liability.
3b. In sudden-onset emergencies (or in the early phases of other emergencies), it might not be feasible for governments to declare an emergency, or for governments and health-care facilities to immediately and offi cially activate their MCC plans. In such cases we suggest clinicians and health-care entities that provide MCC reasonably and in good faith be aff orded liability protections (ie, absent gross negligence, willful misconduct, or criminal acts) through 4. We suggest capacity building in public health include education for families, community health-care workers, and clinicians in addition to infrastructure support such as transportation and communication systems.
5.
We suggest developing countries strive to build capacity by leveraging critical care expertise and resources that exist in such disciplines as surgery, obstetrics, internal medicine, and pediatrics.
6. In order to support those countries with limited critical care assets, we suggest professional critical care societies in resource-rich, developed countries should advocate broadly to mitigate the intellectual siphoning of critical care providers from resource poor countries.
7. We suggest investment in critical care education and development of processes where limited resources can be applied to those patients most likely to benefi t from the interventions.
7a. We suggest such processes explore innovative staffi ng methods and preventative and supportive care that decreases critical illness.
Building Capacity and Quality in District Hospitals:
8. We suggest performance improvement activities be instituted at district or regional level facilities and information shared such that other ICUs and hospitals can learn from one another.
9.
We suggest, where feasible, that surgical capacity of the district or regional hospital build capacity to optimize surgical volumes and maintain skills in order to reduce preventable morbidity and mortality. Prehospital Care and Transport: 11. We suggest education and training of resuscitation, evacuation, and transport of the critically ill be a priority for providers.
Emergency
11a. We suggest expanding pre-hospital support in the community through education of medical and non-medical laypersons.
Strategic Planning to Build Capacity:
12. We suggest developing countries or settings that are chronically resource constrained develop a minimal level of critical care to be provided at district or regional hospital facilities.
12a. We suggest critical care advocates involve administrators, fi nanciers, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other similar stakeholders to provide resources to expand capacity to meet such minimal levels.
13. We suggest focusing limited emergency and critical care resources at facilities where the greatest benefi t can be achieved. Although basic resuscitation capabilities must exist at all levels, rather than developing rudimentary critical care at primary health clinics, district or regional hospitals may be the most eff ective and effi cient areas of focus to improve national critical care capabilities.
External Alliances:
We suggest local authorities establish formal relationships with coalitions of academic medical centers, professional societies, NGO's, and governmental organizations prior to an actual event in disaster-prone, resource poor regions.
We suggest these partnerships have the following objectives: 10. We suggest cost-eff ectiveness studies on critical care in developing countries to justify the need and ability to advocate for resources to provide basic critical care.
To develop and maintain eff ective communication
Quality Improvement Factors 11. We suggest developing countries and health-care organizations institute quality improvement programs, in part to justify to donors, population, and government that increases in investment in health systems provide cost eff ective benefi ts.
Innovative Treatments and Technologies:
12. We suggest professional critical care societies advise and support research that brings new technologies and diagnostic tools to resource-poor settings and stress adapting diagnostic and treatment modalities to this environment in a cost eff ective and effi cient manner.
13. We suggest professional critical care societies advise and guide the development of disaster related protocols to study pressing issues relating to diagnosis, treatment, and systems improvement and have these vetted through ethics committees and other groups a priori in order to rapidly deploy them during or following an event.
Areas for Future Research
Despite increasing numbers of publications in disaster medicine and MCC during the past 5 years, high-quality research to support evidence-based recommendations for the care of critically ill and injured patients related to a pandemic or disaster is virtually nonexistent and desperately needed. Indeed, this research should be a moral imperative in both resource-rich and resourcepoor areas of the world. In the developed world, research should be directed at the provision of critical care during MCC; in resource-poor areas research on building capacity in the current system and on ways to decrease the need for intensive care would be of greater benefi t. Granted, signifi cant challenges exist with regard to conducting research in these settings, 30 but these challenges can be overcome by "disruptive creativity" and planning. Conducting research during disasters or pandemics requires novel approaches to address the unique logistic and ethical and methodology challenges of operating and collaborating in these environments. A number of international collaborative eff orts, such as those led by the ISARIC (International Severe Acute Respiratory and Emerging Infection Consortium; http :// isaric . tghn . org ), InFACT 31 (International Forum for Acute Care Trialists), and PREEDICCT 32 (Providing Resources for Eff ective and Ethical Decisions in Critical Care Triage) groups serve as examples of the types of eff orts required to advance evidence within the fi eld.
Research questions that currently need to be addressed are discussed in detail within each of the individual articles within this supplement. In the absence of scientifi c evidence, experts' opinion, although less than ideal, will have to suffi ce. Clearly, much research needs to be done to enrich the tacit knowledge of experts.
Conclusions
Unfortunately, the potential need to provide care for critically ill or injured patients resulting from pandemics or disasters has not decreased. Lacking high-quality evidence to guide recommendations, the Task Force has endeavored to bolster the expertise of the Task Force and increase the rigor of the process through which the current expert-opinion-based suggestions were developed. In addition to updating the suggestions, this version of the Task Forces' suggestions addresses the broader issue of caring for the critically ill and injured from pandemics and disasters beyond the walls of the ICU, across the age continuum, and those from special populations who are particularly vulnerable to being negatively impacted and who require specialized critical care. Moreover, the Task Force provides suggestions regarding the evacuation of the critically ill and injured as well as the legal, ethical, and systems frameworks necessary to support an eff ective response. Finally, the Task Force has attempted to illustrate how the concepts of MCC should be integrated into the spectrum of surge response from contingency care through crisis care.
